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Abstract 
Arthur Prior (1914-1969) was a New Zealand philosopher who worked primarily on 
Logic and is often refeJTed to as the father of tense logic. In 1949, while lecturing at 
Canterbury University in Ch1istchurch, New Zealand, Prior published Logic and the 
Basis of Ethics, in which he developed a historical background of the 'issue' as he 
called it of describing character and conduct by using ethical predicates. Prior believed 
that when one attempts to describe character and conduct using terms such as 'good' 
and ' bad' one will likely reso11 to giving a definition of those terms to support their use 
in a situation, and then one will be guilty of fallacious reasoning since those terms are 
indefinable. Prior makes reference to almost fifty philosophers and others over the 
course of about one hundred pages, but spends more time on G. E. Moore and Ralph 
Cudworth than many of the others he covers . In this thesis I will critically evaluate 
Prior's arguments in Logic and the Basis of Ethics , in particular those that relate to 
Moore, Cudworth, and the naturalistic fallacy. There is a long-standing debate about 
the naturalistic fallacy because while some argue that it is obviously a fallacy, others 
argue that it is not a fallacy at all , thus the aim in this thesis will be to consider whether 
Prior's arguments regarding the naturalistic fallacy are confused and to illustrate the 
nature of the scholarly controversy. 
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Introduction 
The issue is, roughly, this: We all sometimes describe conduct and 
character (and perhaps other things; but we shall not here be concerned 
with other things) as 'good' or ' bad' , or as ' right' or 'wrong'. Some 
hold that there is nothing out of the ordinary about what these words 
refer to - that they either merely express the feelings of the person 
using them or refer to some 'natural' characteristic of the objects to 
which they are applied, such as their conduciveness or otherwise to 
survival. .. Others hold that ethical predicates - words like 'good' and 
'evil', ' right ' and 'wrong ' - represent qualities which are sui generis, 
in a category on their own , different from all 'natural' qualities. 1 
1 
We do indeed describe conduct and character by using ethical predicates such as 'good' 
and 'evil,' ' right' and 'wrong.' Most would agree with the claim that Mother Teresa 
was a good person , while Hitler was evil. And many would surely support the assertion 
that in most cases lying is wrong, while telling the truth is right. But what exactly does 
it mean to call someone or something 'good' or ' bad,' ' right' or 'wrong'? How does 
one go about defining such ethical terms? It is suggested above, and it is the central 
theme of a branch of philosophy called naturalism, that by calling someone or 
something good, one might merely be expressing a feeling, or referring to a natural 
characteristic that the person or thing possesses. However, these options seem lacking. 
When one asserts that Mother Teresa was a good person one is neither simply 
expressing a subjective feeling, nor is one merely referring to a single natural property 
she may have possessed. These two options are insufficient and do not convey all that 
the term 'good' entails. Similarly, when one calls Hitler evil, one is using an ethical 
term to sum-up a myriad of negative beliefs and claims about both his conduct and his 
character. By using the terms 'good' and 'evil' one is not merely suggesting one thing 
or another. The terms are used to imply a multitude of concepts and ideas. Ethical 
predicates are simple terms used to convey complex messages. 
1 Prior, A. N. (1949) Logic and the Basis of Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. vii 
2 
We all know how to use these terms in everyday language and how they may be applied 
to maintain a distinction between a behaviour and character. When a child acts in a 
naughty manner we might say that the child has been bad, while intending to convey the 
meaning that the child has temporarily behaved badly, but that the character of the child 
is good. For us to be able to employ such a difference - the difference between good 
and bad in regard to conduct and character - in day-to-day language suggests that 
ethical terms are not merely names used to refer to the feelings of the one using them. 
Furthermore, given that one can be of a good character, and yet act badly, ethical 
predicates do not seem to simply refer to a characteristic someone or something 
possesses . The other option suggested in the quote above, and belonging to the non-
naturalist doctrine, is that ethical terms might represent qualities unlike any others and 
that these qualities are in a category of their own. While at first glance this option may 
look preferable one must consider what sort of qualities would be so different from all 
others that they would be in their own category. So, the question remains , how ought 
one to define ethical predicates - and in particular how ought one to define 'good' ? 
This is a thesis that examines a discussion that was popular in the middle of the last 
century. It became popular because so many philosophers had tried their luck at 
adopting one of the options given in the quote above in order to prove, essentially, that 
words like 'good ' either refer to a natural property, or they do not. One philosopher 
gave a historical account of the naturalist/non-naturalist debate, examining arguments 
ranging from the seventeenth century to modern twentieth century theories. That 
philosopher was New Zealander, Arthur Prior (1914-1969). Prior was a noted logician 
and is often referred to as the father of tense logic. 
Prior's most significant achievement was the invention and 
development of tense logic. Tense logic involves two new modal 
operators, 'It will be the case that' and 'It has been the case that'. 
Prior used his tense logic to articulate theories about the structure and 
metaphysics of time, and to mount a robust defence of freewill and 
indeterminism.2 
2 Copeland, B. J. (2007) 'Arthur Prior,' from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
3 
Although Prior was primarily focussed on Logic he also published papers on Ethics, in 
particular on the subject of the logic of ethics. One of his more substantive Ethics 
publications is Logic and the Basis of Ethics (1949); it is in this book that Prior 
develops a historical background of the 'issue,' as he calls it, of describing character 
and conduct by using ethical predicates. The book itself is written in such a way that it 
is extremely difficult to untangle the arguments within it. Prior makes reference to 
almost fifty philosophers and others over the course of about one hundred pages. So 
one often feels at times that arguments have been rushed or thrown in with too little 
explanation , and this is an uncomfortable feeling for a first time reader - unfortunately 
the discomfort does not let up on one ' s subsequent readings either. 
One of the most challenging tasks when reading Logic and the Basis of Ethics is to be 
able to discover what it is P1ior is actually arguing or at least what exactly he wants us 
to take away from the book. He states in the introduction that it is not his intention to 
settle the naturalist/non-naturalist debate, though does tell us that he is a non-naturalist. 
However, throughout the book he does not really develop his own argument as to why 
the non-naturalist's way of thinking is the correct route to follow. By declaring himself 
a non-naturalist from the beginning he left himself open to the criticism that he must 
have had a reason for choosing this side and it seems odd that he would not give an 
explanation or argument behind that reasoning. From this one can only assume that the 
point of the book was not really to persuade us one way or the other but to present the 
facts in a historical context. This is well and good, but throughout the chapters what is 
presented seems to attack naturalism more so than it does non-naturalism. The first 
chapter is an account of one of the better-known criticisms of naturalism, the 
naturalistic fallacy, and it is the discussion of this fallacy that sets the tone for the rest 
of the book. 
The naturalistic fallacy is famously described by the twentieth century philosopher G. 
E. Moore in his 1902 work Principia Ethica and is essentially the theory that because 
the ethical term 'good' is said to be indefinable any attempt by naturalists (or others for 
that matter) to define 'good' will result in committing this fallacy. It is argued by some 
that the naturalistic fallacy occurs because those who attempt to define 'good' do so in 
natural terms such as 'pleasant' or 'desired,' and because the term 'good' is ethical and 
not natural these attempts fail. Others argue that the naturalistic fallacy occurs through 
4 
trying to deduce ethical propositions from a set of non-ethical premises, which is 
similar, but not the same, as attempting to define an ethical word in natural terms. The 
nature of the naturalistic fallacy has been the subject of much debate because on the one 
hand there are those who claim that it is obviously a fallacy (sometimes for different 
reasons) , and on the other hand there are those who argue it is not a fallacy at all. 
Regarding fallacies Prior claims: 
The exposure of fallacious ethical arguments is ... a task which it seems 
to be necessary to perform anew in every age. It is something like 
housekeeping, or lawnmowing, or shaving. [But even] when we know 
beforehand that some system must be fallacious - that what it sets out 
to do, simply cannot be done - we learn something in the effort to 
discover just where the fallacy lies. 3 
Over the course of the nine studies in the book Prior accuses naturalists and non-
naturalists alike of committing not only the naturali st ic fallacy but also other fallacies, 
which he says are "not unlike" it. Despite spendi ng much of his time making 
accusations with regard to fallacies and despite the thrust of the quotation above one of 
the points that I will highlight throughout my study is that Prior himself does not give 
an adequate explanation of how the fallacies he mentions work and how they differ 
from each other. 
P1ior makes an interesting reference to Aristotle in his introduction, the purpose of 
which may have been to hint at what his overall aim was: 
[T]his particular controversy has a special interest for the logician, for 
the following reason: Aristotle divides the possible subjects of inquiry 
and dispute into three broad sorts - 'natural', 'ethical', and 'logical'.4 
Ethical naturalism may be broadly described as the view that 'ethical' 
propositions and inquiries are in the end just a sub-species of 'natural' 
ones. But we shall find that both those who assert this and those who 
deny it frequently end up by identifying ethical propositions with 
logical ones. And this of course, imposes upon the logician the 
responsibility of showing that it is not possible to solve the difficulties 
of either side in this way. 5 
3 Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics, pp. x-xi 
4 The passage to which Prior makes reference is Topics, 105bl9-29. Prior himself does not give the 
fassage . I will discuss this further in part three of this thesis. 
Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics, p. viii 
5 
More specifically, Prior's aim was to show us that "purely logical considerations" 
cannot settle the naturalist/non-naturalist debate since it is a mistake to identify ethical 
propositions and enquires with natural or logical ones. The purpose of Prior's reference 
to Aristotle may have simply been to indicate that there are three distinct categories of 
enquiry and that one ought to keep this in mind when considering the naturalist/non-
naturalist debate. It may have also been to caution us about falling into fallacious 
reasoning, which he believed philosophers do fall into when they attempt to settle 
ethical issues by purely logical considerations. So Prior as we shall see is especially 
concerned to emphasise a separation between Ethics and Logic. 
As we saw above Prior thinks of exposing fallacious arguments as something that must 
be done in every age. It is as tedious a need as it is to mow lawns or shave. I think this 
shows very much so that his aim is to make us aware that fallacies happen , they happen 
in every century and we all need to be aware of the tendency to fall into such traps. He 
seems to think that we need to be vigilant in our development of arguments so as not to 
lead ourselves down the path to the naturalistic fallacy , or fallacies like it. However, a 
number of philosophers do not find Prior's own arguments in Logic and the Basis of 
Ethics convincing. One of the aims in this thesis will be to consider whether Prior's 
arguments are flawed, or inconsistent, and to illustrate the nature of the scholarly 
controversy. 
In a review of Prior's book, W . K. Frankena commends Prior' s discussion of the 
naturalist/non-naturalist debate, but counters it with the criticism that "it is hard to see 
just what it adds up to, or how it is related to his treatment of the naturalistic fallacy."6 
Charner Perry also gives a similar criticism in his review stating that 
... his [Prior's] doctrines, despite their apparent clarity and plausibility, 
do not constitute a clear and adequate solution of the problems with 
which he deals. They evidently involve assumptions and distinctions 
which are not recognized or examined, they raise a number of difficult 
questions about logic, ethics, and the relation between the two, and 
6 Frankena, W. K. '[Untitled] Reviewed work(s): Logic and the Basis of Ethics,' in The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Oct. , 1950), p.555 
apparently solving problems which are not sufficiently analysed they 
confuse rather than clarify the issues.7 
6 
This quote is a fine summation of the problem with Logic and the Basis of Ethics but it 
is this very problem, the lack of clarity, which has made an analysis of it so challenging 
and so worthwhile. Prior made a contribution to philosophy both in Logic and Ethics , 
and my purpose is to offer a critical evaluation of Logic and the Basis of Ethics so that 
we may come to better understand the precise nature of Prior's contribution. In this 
thesis I have one over-arching aim, and that is to give a critical evaluation of Prior's 
arguments with respect to the naturalistic fallacy. If, as some of Prior's critics insist, 
the naturalistic fallacy is not in fact a fallacy, then it becomes crucially important to 
examine this part of Prior' s claim. 
One of the downfalls in the book is that P1ior makes reference to far too many theories 
in the small amount of space (approximately 100 pages) he allows himself. I do not 
want to make the same mistake, so in order to give a clear and concise account of 
Prior's arguments I have chosen to limit my study to Prior's treatment of G. E. Moore 
and Ralph Cudworth. Of the many philosophers ' theo1ies he canvasses Prior spends 
more time on a certain few. Moore and Cudworth are among the ones to whom he 
devotes lengthy discussions, so it makes sense to analyse whether Prior's arguments 
regarding them were fair, and then examine how those arguments relate to the 
naturalistic fallacy. 
This thesis, then, will be divided into four parts: 
1. Part one will involve a close textual analysis of G. E. Moore's arguments 
concerning the term 'good,' found primarily in his Principia Ethica, followed 
by Prior's account and criticisms of Moore's theory. 
2. Part two will involve a close textual analysis of Ralph Cudworth's A Treatise 
Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. In this part it will become 
apparent how Moore and Cudworth's arguments differ. There will also be a 
discussion of the way in which Prior criticised both Moore and Cudworth's 
7 Perry, C. '[Untitled] Reviewed work(s): Logic and the Basis of Ethics,' in Ethics, Vol. 62, No. l. (Oct., 
1951),p.71 
7 
arguments and why he accused them of arguing in the same way despite their 
seemingly different arguments. 
3. Part three will be p1imarily concerned with Prior's own arguments regarding the 
naturalistic fallacy and its consequences. This part will also involve a detailed 
discussion of the structure of selected fallacies drawing on W. K. Frankena's 
article 'The Naturalistic Fallacy.' 
4. Part four will be a culmination of the information accumulated throughout the 
previous sections and will involve a close textual study of Prier's arguments in 
Logic and the Basis of Ethics specifically regarding Moore and Cudworth. 
There are senous questions to consider about P1ior's interpretation of Moore and 
Cudworth. And there is a long-standing debate about his analysis of the naturalistic 
fallacy. In this thesis I look at each in turn with the purpose not to resolve the 
naturalist/non-naturalist debate, (though it will serve as a rebuttal to the non-naturalist's 
claim that so many commit the naturalistic fal lacy) but to analyse the arguments found 
within Prier's book. This thesis will be constructed with the intent to show that while 
Prior may have been correct to caution that purely logical considerations cannot settle 
the naturalist/non-natural debate, his arguments in Logic and rhe Basis of Ethics against 
philosophers such as Moore and Cudworth regarding fallacies, especially the 
naturalistic fallacy, may be confused and perhaps even flawed. 8 
8 In this thesis the paths that Prior believed led to committing the naturalistic fallacy will be outlined . 
One of these paths is through deducing ethical propositions from non-ethical premises. I will not go into 
detail here but must make note that in a later article 'The Autonomy of Ethics,' in Papers on Logic, Prior 
retracts his claim that this leads to committing the naturalistic fallacy . Although this is an important point 
it only strengthens my claim that Prier's arguments regarding the naturalistic fallacy in Logic and the 
Basis of Ethics seem somewhat confused. 
